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(163) 
ESSAY 
IS THE PHILADELPHIA WAGE TAX UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
AND IF IT IS, WHAT CAN AND SHOULD THE CITY DO? 
MICHAEL S. KNOLL† & RUTH MASON‡ 
Philadelphia, the fifth largest city in the United States with a population 
over 1.5 million,1 has a complex and antiquated tax system. The Philadelphia 
tax system in general, and the City’s business taxes in particular, have long 
been criticized for driving employers and jobs away from Philadelphia by 
making it expensive to conduct business in the City. According to Professor 
Robert Inman of the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, taxes 
alone make operating a business in Philadelphia 19% more expensive than in 
the suburbs.2 And those tax-induced higher costs have had a dramatic effect. 
According to Inman, about half of the 300,000 jobs Philadelphia lost between 
 
© Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason 2016. All rights reserved. 
† Deputy Dean and Theodore Warner Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School; Professor of Real Estate, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; Co-Director, 
Center for Tax Law and Policy, University of Pennsylvania. 
‡ Hunton & Williams Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. 
Thanks to Robert Inman and Wolfgang Schön for helpful conversations and to Alvin Dong for 
assistance with the research. 
1 See Dylan Purcell & Maria Panaritis, Philadelphia Gains Population Despite Challenges, 
PHILLY.COM (Mar. 27, 2015), http://articles.philly.com/2015-03-27/news/60520945_1_new-census-
data-david-elesh-montgomery-counties [https://perma.cc/G6E6-UWU7] (reporting the population 
of Philadelphia at the end of 2014 as 1,560,297); The Largest U.S. Cities: Cities Ranked 1 to 100, CITY 
MAYORS STAT., www.citymayors.com/gratis/uscities_100.html [https://perma.cc/E2Z2-K6CC] 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2016) (placing Philadelphia fifth as of 2012). 
2 CENT. PHILA. DEV. CORP., CENTER CITY REPORTS: PATHWAYS TO JOB GROWTH 15 
(2014), http://www.centercityphila.org/docs/CCR14_employment.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RMM-
9SRR] [hereinafter PATHWAYS TO JOB GROWTH] (citing ROBERT P. INMAN, LOCAL TAXES AND 
THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF PHILADELPHIA: 2008 REPORT (2009), http://www.phila.gov/
taxpolicy/PDFs/localTaxesAndEconomicFuture.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN5D-STX4]). 
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the 1960s and 1990s are attributable to the City’s tax system, which Inman 
described as “a primary contributor to the city’s decline” over that period.3 
Although Philadelphia is not the only city facing fiscal challenges, the 
specific problems Philadelphia faces are not widely shared by other cities. 
Philadelphia places an unusually large tax burden on highly mobile factors of 
production, such as capital and labor, and less on fixed factors, most notably 
land. According to a 2014 report, 66% of Philadelphia’s tax revenue comes 
from taxing mobile wages and profits.4 In contrast, for New York and 
Washington, D.C., the comparable figures are 34% and 35%.5 And only 17% of 
Philadelphia’s tax revenue comes from real estate, whereas the corresponding 
figures for New York and Washington, D.C., are 41% and 36%.6 Moreover, not 
only does Philadelphia place an excessively high reliance on taxing mobile 
factors of production, but the centerpiece of the Philadelphia tax system, the 
Philadelphia wage tax—which raised more than $1.6 billion in 20147—now 
faces a constitutional challenge. Several petitions recently filed with the 
Philadelphia Tax Review Board seek a declaration that the wage tax, one of 
Philadelphia’s largest sources of revenue and one of its most controversial 
business taxes, is unconstitutional.8 Although the cases have not yet been 
heard, let alone decided, in our view the Philadelphia wage tax—is clearly 
unconstitutional as currently constructed (as described below). Accordingly, 
the City will soon face the question whether to save the wage tax by reforming 
it or eliminating it altogether and replacing it with other sources of revenue. 
This Essay explains the constitutional challenge to the City wage tax, 
describes steps that could be taken to save that tax, and raises the question of 
whether Philadelphia should save or eliminate its wage tax. 
  
 
3 Christopher Wink, Philly’s City Wage Tax Just Turned 75. Here’s Its Dubious Legacy, 
TECHNICAL.LY PHILLY (Dec. 12, 2014), http://technical.ly/philly/2014/12/12/Philadelphia-city-
wage-tax [https://perma.cc/2G34-HS4W]. 
4 PATHWAYS TO JOB GROWTH, supra note 2, at 15. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Jim Saksa, U.S. Supreme Court Decision Imperils a Portion of Wage Tax in Philadelphia and 
Wilmington; Officials Unwilling or Unable to Estimate Likely Budget Impact, PLANPHILLY (Dec. 14, 
2015), http://planphilly.com/articles/2015/12/14/u-s-supreme-court-decision-imperils-a-portion-of-
income-tax-in-philadelphia-and-wilmington-officials-unwilling-or-unable-to-estimate-likely-
budget-impact [https://perma.cc/ZF2S-S295]. 
8 Id. 
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I.  THE PHILADELPHIA WAGE TAX 
In 1939, Philadelphia became the first municipality in the United States 
to impose an income-type tax when it enacted a 1.5% wage tax.9 Over time, 
the wage tax increased, reaching a high of 4.96% in 1983, where it stayed until 
the mid-1990s.10 Since the mid-1990s the wage tax rate has been steadily but 
slowly decreasing.11 
The City imposes a tax on “[s]alaries, wages, commissions and other 
compensation paid by an employer” to employees.12 Residents of 
Philadelphia are subject to the wage tax regardless of the state in which they 
work.13 Nonresidents pay the wage tax on their compensation from 
employment in Philadelphia.14 Individuals who are self-employed do not pay 
the wage tax. Instead, they are subject to the City’s net profit tax, which is 
levied on net profits from the operation of a trade, business, or profession 
conducted by individuals, partnerships or associations.15 The City’s net profit 
tax is at the same rate as its wage tax, with the difference that the wage tax is 
on gross wages whereas the net profit tax is on net profits. Neither the wage 
tax nor the net profit tax allows residents a credit for taxes paid to other 
jurisdictions. (In general, when we talk about the wage tax, what we say will 
also apply to the net profit tax.) 
Table 1 illustrates the City wage tax. The left column represents 
Philadelphia residents and the right column represents residents of states 
other than Pennsylvania. Residents and nonresidents can earn income outside 
Pennsylvania (top row) or in Philadelphia (bottom row).16 The Philadelphia 
tax regime has three components: 
 
9 Wink, supra note 3. 
10 CITY OF PHILA., INCOME TAX REGULATIONS, at vi (2002), http://www.phila.gov/trb/pdfs/
income_tax_regs.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8FU-V44H] [hereinafter CITY INCOME TAX REGULATIONS]. 
11 Id. at vii-viii. 
12 Id. at § 102(a). 
13 See id. at § 205 (“The entire compensation received by an employee . . . is subject to this  
tax . . . . [T]he place or places in or at which the services were rendered [is not] material in 
determining liability for the tax.”). 
14 Id. § 207. 
15 Id. §§ 102(b), 103(b), 202, 220. 
16 Table 1, which shows residents of Philadelphia and residents of states other than 
Pennsylvania, does not show residents of Pennsylvania who live outside Philadelphia or income 
earned in Pennsylvania, but outside of Philadelphia. We excluded those details from Table 1 because 
the Court’s test for tax discrimination, described below, can be illustrated most simply and 
intuitively by focusing on Philadelphia and non-Pennsylvania residents and income. 
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1. A flat tax of 3.91% on income earned in Philadelphia by Philadelphia 
residents (domestic tax, Td, bottom left quadrant)17 
2. A flat tax of 3.91% on income earned outside Pennsylvania by Philadelphia 
residents (outbound tax, To, top left quadrant)18 
3. A flat tax of 3.4828% on income earned in Philadelphia by nonresidents of 
Pennsylvania (inbound tax, Ti, bottom right quadrant)19 
Philadelphia, however, does not tax and cannot tax because of a lack of 
nexus the non-Pennsylvania income of nonresidents (the top right quadrant). 
 
Table 1: Philadelphia Wage Tax 
 Philadelphia Resident 
Resident of  
Another State 
Activity in 
Another State 
Outbound Tax (To) 
3.91% 
N/A 
Activity in 
Philadelphia 
Domestic Tax (Td) 
3.91% 
Inbound Tax (Ti) 
3.4828% 
II.  THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Although state governments, and derivatively municipal governments, 
have wide powers to tax residents on their worldwide income and 
nonresidents on the income they earn within the jurisdiction, the 
Constitution limits these taxing powers.20 One of the most important 
limitations is the Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The 
Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate [c]ommerce . . . among 
the several [s]tates.”21 The Commerce Clause’s broad grant of authority was 
a response to the economic situation prior to the Constitution’s adoption. 
 
17 CITY OF PHILA., SUMMARY SCHEDULE OF TAX RATES SINCE 1952, at 3 (July 2015), 
http://www.phila.gov/Revenue/Documents/Tax%20Summary%20Schedule%20rev%207.1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3BC3-UGFC]. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 See I JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION pts. II–III 
(2d ed. 1993) (describing constitutional restrictions and limitations on state taxation). State (and local) 
governments cannot constitutionally tax nonresidents on their out-of-state income. Thus, for example, 
Pennsylvania can tax Pennsylvania residents on their Pennsylvania and out-of-state (say Virginia) 
income, but Pennsylvania cannot tax out-of-state residents (say Virginia residents) on their income 
earned in other states (say Virginia or California). Pennsylvania is said to lack the nexus to tax 
nonresidents on their income from outside the state. Nexus is a constitutional requirement for taxation. 
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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Under the Articles of Confederation, the central government had very little 
power over economic affairs and so the states would regularly enact 
protectionist legislation. Such legislation tended to divide the national 
marketplace into separate state markets dominated by local interests. A strong 
national government that could protect commerce was seen as necessary to 
the creation of a national economic market.22 
In its “dormant” or “negative” Commerce Clause doctrine, the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause’s affirmative grant of power to 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce to preclude the states from 
interfering with interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has 
long interpreted the Commerce Clause to prohibit states from discriminating 
against out-of-state parties.23 Although discriminatory taxes are 
unconstitutional, ascertaining whether a state (or local) tax is discriminatory 
has proven difficult and contentious, and the tests for doing so have varied 
over time.24 However, the Supreme Court’s most recent tax discrimination 
case, Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, reinvigorated an  
easy-to-implement test for discrimination. 
III.  WYNNE: REINVIGORATING INTERNAL CONSISTENCY 
Brian and Karen Wynne, a married couple with five children who resided 
in Howard County, Maryland, brought suit against Maryland alleging that a 
portion of the Maryland individual income tax violated the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.25 Maryland formally divided its individual income tax 
into a “state” portion with a maximum rate of 4.75%, and a “county” portion 
with rates ranging from 1.25% to 3.2%.26 The Wynnes resided in Howard 
County, where the “county” tax rate was 3.2%. Thus, the Wynnes paid 
“county” tax of 3.2% on both their Maryland income and on their  
non-Maryland income. In contrast, nonresidents paid “county” tax of 1.25% 
 
22 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (“[I]n order to succeed, the new Union 
would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among 
the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.”). 
23 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005) (“The Commerce Clause emerged as the 
Framers’ response to the central problem giving rise to the Constitution itself: the absence of any 
federal commerce power under the Articles of Confederation. For the first century of our history, 
the primary use of the Clause was to preclude the kind of discriminatory state legislation that had 
once been permissible.”). 
24 See, e.g., Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1809 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s “bestiary of ad hoc tests and ad hoc exceptions that we apply 
nowadays, including the substantial nexus test, the fair apportionment test, and the fair relation test”); 
id. at 1809 (“The internal consistency rule invoked by the Court nicely showcases our ad hocery.”). 
25 Id. at 1793 (Alito, J., majority). 
26 MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. §§ 10-105(a) (West 2007), 10-106(a)(1) (West 2001). 
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on their Maryland income.27 Maryland allowed taxes paid to other states to 
fully offset the “state” portion of the tax, but it disallowed any credit against 
the “county” tax.28 
The Wynnes challenged only the “county” tax,29 which we illustrate in 
Table 2 below for Howard County, Maryland, where the Wynnes resided. 
 
Table 2: Maryland “County” Tax as Applied to Howard County 
 
Howard County, 
Maryland Resident 
Resident of  
Another State 
Activity in  
Another State 
Outbound Tax (To) 
3.2% 
N/A 
Activity in 
Howard County, 
Maryland 
Domestic Tax (Td) 
3.2% 
Inbound Tax (Ti) 
1.25% 
 
By analogy to Table 1, the left column in Table 2 represents residents of 
Howard County, Maryland and the right column represents residents of 
other states. Howard County residents and residents of states other than 
Maryland earn income in Howard County (bottom row) and outside 
Maryland (top row). Howard County taxes residents at 3.2% on both their 
Howard County income (bottom left quadrant) and their out-of-state income 
(top left quadrant). Howard County also taxes non-Maryland residents at 
1.25% on their Howard County income (bottom right quadrant). Maryland, 
however, does not tax and cannot tax because of a lack of nexus the non-Maryland 
income of nonresidents (the top right quadrant).30 
 
27 See MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-106.1 (West 2004) (setting the nonresident “county” 
tax equal to the “lowest county income tax rate set by any Maryland County”); REVENUE ADMIN. 
DIV., COMPTROLLER OF MD., STATE & LOCAL TAX FORMS & INSTRUCTIONS 10  
(2006), http://forms.marylandtaxes.com/06_forms/residentbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/CAW6-UCAK] 
(indicating that in 2006, Worchester County had the lowest county income tax rate of 1.25%). 
28 MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-703(a) (West 1995). 
29 The formal division by Maryland of its taxes into “state” and “county” taxes has no effect 
on constitutional analysis, as both types of taxes are considered to be state taxes for constitutional 
purposes. See, e.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 417, 434 (1946) (striking down a municipal 
license tax on business solicitors for violating the Dormant Commerce Clause); Frey v. Comptroller of 
Treasury, 29 A.3d 475, 492 (Md. 2011) (concluding that Maryland’s “county” income taxes were state 
taxes for constitutional law purposes). 
30 By analogy to Table 1, Table 2 does not show Maryland residents who live outside Howard 
County, nor does it show income earned in Maryland, but outside of Howard County. Such persons 
and income are excluded from Table 2 because their inclusions are not necessary to show that the 
challenged Maryland tax fails the internal consistency test. 
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In Wynne, a sharply divided Supreme Court struck down the Maryland 
“county” tax on the ground that the tax violated the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.31 In striking down the Maryland tax, the Court relied upon the 
internal consistency test. Prior to Wynne, the Court had evoked the internal 
consistency test in seven cases and had used that test to strike down a state 
statute in three.32 Nevertheless, the Court had been narrowing the test in 
recent years and had not struck down a state tax for failing the internal 
consistency test for roughly thirty years.33 As described by the Supreme 
Court twenty years ago: 
Internal consistency is preserved when the imposition of a tax identical to 
the one in question by every other State would add no burden to interstate 
commerce that intrastate commerce would not also bear. This test asks 
nothing about the degree of economic reality reflected by the tax, but simply 
looks to the structure of the tax at issue to see whether its identical application 
by every State in the Union would place interstate commerce at a 
disadvantage as compared with commerce intrastate.34 
Thus, the internal consistency test directs a court to assume that every 
state enacts the challenged state’s tax regime, and then it asks whether, under 
such hypothetical harmonization, interstate commerce bears more tax than 
purely in-state commerce. Accordingly, in order to test the Maryland 
“county” tax for internal consistency, the Court assumed counterfactually that 
every other state enacted the challenged Maryland tax and then the Court 
looked to see how cross-border income would be taxed as compared to  
in-state income. We illustrate the Court’s application of the internal 
consistency test in Table 3. 
 
  
 
31 135 S. Ct. at 1803-06. 
32 See id. at 1801-02 (citing Cent. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948); Gwin, 
White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939); and J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 
U.S. 307 (1938) as cases in which internally inconsistent tax schemes were held unconstitutional). 
33 See id. at 1820-21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing the sparse use of the internal consistency 
test in the past as supporting restrained use of the test now). 
34 Okla. Tax Comm’n. v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995). 
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Table 3: Maryland “County” Tax Fails the Internal Consistency Test 
 
Howard County,  
Maryland Resident 
Resident of Another State 
Activity in  
Another State 
Ti + To 
4.45% 
Td 
3.2% 
Activity in 
Howard 
County, 
Maryland 
Td 
3.2% 
Ti +To 
4.45% 
 
Table 3 takes a single state (say Delaware) as a proxy for the other forty-
nine states and assumes that state adopts the challenged Maryland tax. Table 3 
then allows for simple comparisons of the tax burden imposed on in-state and 
cross-border commerce. Maryland residents (the left column) are subject to 
tax on their Maryland income only by Maryland (bottom left quadrant), but 
they are subject to both Delaware and Maryland taxation on their Delaware 
income (upper left quadrant). Similarly, Delaware residents are subject to tax 
only by Delaware on their Delaware income (top right quadrant), but they 
are subject to both Maryland and Delaware taxation on their Maryland income 
(bottom right quadrant). The shaded quadrants in Table 3 represent cross-border 
activity, and they show that, under the assumption that all states adopt the 
Maryland tax system, such income is taxed more heavily than domestic 
income. In the top left quadrant, the inbound tax (Ti) combines with the 
outbound tax (To) to increase the burden on Marylanders’ out-of-state 
activities (4.45%). This combination also occurs in the lower right quadrant, 
which represents the burden on non-Marylanders’ activities in Maryland. In 
contrast, for domestic income, the tax is only Td (3.2%). Maryland’s tax regime 
is internally inconsistent—thus violating the Dormant Commerce  
Clause—because under the Supreme Court’s hypothetical harmonization, 
interstate income bears more tax (4.45%) than purely in-state income 
(3.2%).35 Accordingly, the Supreme Court struck down the Maryland tax  
as unconstitutional. 
 
35 On cross-border income, taxpayers would pay a tax of 1.25% to the state where the income 
arose and a tax of 3.2% to their state of residence. Because neither tax would have been deductible 
from the other, the total tax would be 4.45%. 
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IV.  APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE ARTICULATED IN WYNNE  
TO THE PHILADELPHIA WAGE TAX 
The application of Wynne to the Philadelphia wage tax is straightforward, 
as illustrated in Table 4. As with the Maryland “county” tax challenged in 
Wynne and illustrated in Table 3, it is easiest and most intuitive to analyze the 
Philadelphia wage tax by considering one state, say New Jersey, as a proxy for 
the other forty-nine states. Assume Camden, New Jersey, adopts the 
Philadelphia wage tax. Residents of Philadelphia and Camden who work 
where they live will pay only the domestic tax on their wages (Td), which 
totals 3.91%. In contrast, residents of either Philadelphia or Camden who 
reside in one city, but work in the other city, will pay both the inbound and 
the outbound taxes (Ti + To) for a combined tax rate of 7.3928%. Because 
under hypothetical harmonization cross-border commerce is taxed at a higher 
rate (7.3928%) than in-state commerce (3.91%), the Philadelphia wage tax is 
internally inconsistent and under the majority’s analysis in Wynne, the tax 
unconstitutionally discriminates against cross-border commerce. 
 
Table 4: Challenged Philadelphia Tax Under the Internal Consistency Test 
 Philadelphia Resident Resident of Another State 
Activity in  
Another State 
Ti + To 
7.3928% 
Td 
3.91% 
Activity in 
Philadelphia 
Td 
3.91% 
Ti +To 
7.3928% 
 
It should come as no surprise that the Philadelphia wage tax is internally 
inconsistent because the Maryland tax and the Philadelphia tax are similar in 
structure. Both the Maryland tax and the Philadelphia tax subject residents 
to tax on their domestic and outbound income at the same rate. At the same 
time, both Maryland and Philadelphia assess an inbound tax on nonresidents’ 
inbound income, and neither Maryland nor Philadelphia provides residents a 
credit for taxes paid to the source jurisdiction (the other state) on their  
out-of-state income.36 The regimes differ in their rates, but here the 
 
36 Although the structures of the Philadelphia wage tax and the Maryland “county” tax are 
similar, they are not identical. For example, Maryland has a uniform state-wide inbound tax rate, 
which equals the state’s minimum domestic tax rate (1.25%). In contrast, the Philadelphia inbound 
tax rate (3.4828%) exceeds the inbound and domestic tax rates outside of Philadelphia (0). Although 
such differences cannot save the Philadelphia wage tax from the same fate as the Maryland “county” 
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Philadelphia wage tax rate is even higher than the Maryland “county” tax 
rate. Because the inbound Philadelphia wage tax is higher than the inbound 
Maryland “county” tax, the incremental tax on cross-border activity is greater 
with the Philadelphia wage tax (3.4828%) than it was with the Maryland 
“county” tax (1.25%). 
V.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNAL CONSISTENCY  
AND DISCRIMINATION 
Maryland and its supporters did not argue that the Maryland “county” 
tax was internally consistent. Instead, they argued that the Maryland tax was 
not discriminatory because it did not discourage cross-border commerce and 
hence should have been upheld. To support the argument that Maryland did 
not discriminate against its own residents’ out-of-state income, Maryland and 
its supporters pointed to the equality of the tax rates on residents’ Maryland 
and out-of-state income. Since Maryland set both rates at 3.2%, Maryland 
reasoned that it did not discourage residents from earning income outside of 
Maryland.37 
Maryland had similarly defended its inbound tax from constitutional 
challenge in an earlier case.38 In that case, Maryland compared the inbound 
tax rate of 1.25% with the domestic tax of 3.2%, and Maryland reasoned that 
it did not discriminate against nonresidents because it taxed nonresidents at 
a lower rate than its own residents. Thus, Maryland and its supporters argued 
that the tax non-discrimination principle should be written as follows: 
Td ≥ Ti and Td ≥ To  (1) 
Equation 1 says that a tax system is not discriminatory if the domestic tax 
rate equals or exceeds each of the inbound and the outbound tax rate. 
In Wynne, the Court addressed and explicitly rejected that argument. In 
striking down the Maryland “county” tax and reinvigorating the internal 
consistency test, the Court relied on an amicus brief we wrote and another 
amicus brief submitted by eight tax economists and principally written by 
Alan Viard.39 Those two briefs explained the economic underpinnings for the 
 
tax, those differences might make it more difficult to save the Philadelphia wage tax by crediting 
local taxes than to save the Maryland “county” tax by crediting local taxes. 
37 Brief for the Petitioner at 35-36, Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 
(2015) (No. 13-485). See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Wynne, 135. S. Ct. 1787 (No. 13-485) 
(the Assistant to the Solicitor General argued on Maryland’s behalf that the Court should reject the 
discrimination claim because Maryland’s domestic and outbound tax rates were equal). 
38 See Frey v. Comptroller of Treasury, 29 A.3d 475, 505 (Md. 2011) (holding that the Maryland 
tax “satisfies the compensatory tax doctrine and, consequently, does not violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause”). 
39 Brief of Michael S. Knoll and Ruth Mason as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (No. 13-485) [hereinafter Knoll & Mason Brief]; Brief of the Tax Economists 
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internal consistency test, and the Court described the economic analysis in 
those two briefs as “undisputed.”40 Those briefs in turn drew upon academic 
work by us and others.41 
As we have described in our prior academic work, it is common and (to 
most non-economists) intuitive to assume that the impact of taxes on 
competition can be understood from absolute comparisons of tax rates in only 
the market of interest. Although Maryland did not put its argument in 
precisely those terms, that is what it argued. But that intuition is wrong. As 
basic economic textbooks describe, jobs and investments are held not 
according to absolute advantage, but according to comparative advantage.42 
Thus, it follows that determining whether a tax system is neutral between 
intrastate and interstate commerce requires looking beyond the particular 
market in question. In order to determine the impact of a state’s taxes on 
interstate competition, we need to consider how a state taxes residents and 
nonresidents on both in-state and out-of-state income. Our principal result 
can be expressed as requiring adherence to a simple rule: all taxes should be 
assessed on either a uniform source or a uniform residence basis.43 A source tax 
is uniform if it applies at the same rate and on the same base44 to both 
 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (No. 13-485) [hereinafter Tax 
Economists Brief]. In addition to these two briefs, friends of the court filed twelve other briefs in 
Wynne, including the Solicitor General, who filed an amicus brief for the United States in support 
of Maryland. 
40 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804. 
41 See Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, Waiting for Perseus: A Sur-Reply to Graetz and Warren, 
67 TAX L. REV. 375 (2014) (responding to Professors Graetz and Warren’s criticisms of competitive 
neutrality); Ruth Mason & Michael Knoll, A Brief Sur-Reply to Professors Graetz and Warren, 123 YALE 
L.J.F. 1 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/a-brief-sur-reply-to-professors-graetz-and-
warren [https://perma.cc/MM2R-L5JJ] (same); Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What Is Tax 
Discrimination?, 121 YALE L.J. 1014 (2012) [hereinafter Mason & Knoll, Tax Discrimination] (arguing 
that a tax nondiscrimination principle requires competitive neutrality among states, but does not 
require identical taxation of residents and nonresidents). See generally Ryan Lirette & Alan D. Viard, 
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce and Income Flows: The Economics of Neutrality 1 (Am. Enter. Inst., 
Working Paper No. 2014-07, 2014). 
42 Expressed more formally, taxes distort the allocation of jobs and investments only when 
they affect comparative advantage. Accordingly, the competitive position of an economic actor 
considering working or investing in a particular market is determined not simply by how that actor 
is taxed in the particular market relative to how other actors are taxed in that market (absolute advantage). 
Rather, it is determined by the relationship between how that actor is taxed in the particular market and 
how that actor is taxed in alternative markets as compared to the relationship between how that actor’s 
competitors are taxed in the particular market and alternative markets (comparative advantage). See 
Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, The Economic Foundation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, VA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2754321 (explaining 
the connections between the economic principle of comparative advantage, the doctrine of tax 
discrimination, and the internal consistency test). 
43 See Mason & Knoll, Tax Discrimination, supra note 41, at 1060-74 (describing uniformity 
requirements of taxes to prevent them from distorting competition). 
44 “Tax base” refers to the rules for calculating taxable income. 
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residents’ and nonresidents’ income from the state. A residence tax is uniform 
if it applies at the same rate and on the same base to residents’ in-state and 
out-of-state income.45 
In the special case where the challenge is only to a tax system’s rates (not 
to the tax base), the above rule reduces to a simple mathematical formula. 
The requirement that both a state’s source and residence taxes apply to its 
own residents (coupled with a recognition that the Dormant Commerce 
Clause prohibits states from discouraging cross-border commerce, but does 
not prohibit them from encouraging such commerce) implies that the tax rate 
assessed by a state on its residents’ domestic income, Td, must equal or exceed 
the combined tax imposed on residents’ outbound income, To, and 
nonresidents’ inbound income, Ti. When residents are taxed on worldwide 
income and are allowed neither a deduction nor a credit for taxes paid on 
outbound income,46 this can be written arithmetically as follows: 
Td ≥ Ti + To  (2) 
 Equation 2 says the tax rate paid by residents on domestic income must 
equal or exceed the sum of the tax rates paid by residents on outbound income 
and by nonresidents on inbound income. 
Equation 2 resembles the internal consistency test as can be readily seen 
from Table 4, where the Philadelphia wage tax was shown to be internally 
inconsistent because the tax rate on domestic income (Td) was less than the 
combined tax rate on inbound and outbound income (Ti + To).47 Thus, not 
only does the internal consistency have the doctrinal backing of the Supreme 
Court, it is an economically sensible test for discrimination. It is a sensible 
economic test for discrimination because, as we have argued in our academic 
work,48 and as Wynne confirms,49 discrimination means discouraging cross-
border commerce at the expense of in-state commerce. 
 
45 In a recent working paper, Alan Viard and Ryan Lirette analogize non-uniform taxes to 
tariffs because such taxes have an effect similar to a tariff: they discourage cross-border commerce 
in favor of in-state commerce. Lirette & Viard, supra note 41. 
46 Equation 2 assumes the taxing jurisdiction (Philadelphia) does not allow residents either a 
credit or a deduction for taxes paid on outbound income to other jurisdictions. As we show in earlier 
work, for worldwide taxation not to distort cross-border commerce, residence states must either 
provide an unlimited foreign tax credit or taxes on outbound income must be deductible. In the 
latter case, Equation 2 is written as: Td ≥ Ti + To – (Ti × To). See Mason & Knoll, Tax Discrimination, 
supra note 41, at 1064-69 (describing what we call “ideal deduction”). 
47 Both the internal consistency test as illustrated in Table 4 and as described in Equation 2 
require that the domestic tax rate equal at least 7.3928% given an outbound tax of 3.91%, an inbound 
tax of 3.4828%, and no provision for a deduction or a credit for taxes paid to the source state against 
outbound income. 
48 See supra notes 41–42. 
49 Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1804 (2015) (calling our and the 
Tax Economists’ economic analysis “undisputed”). 
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VI.  GOING FORWARD:  
HOW PHILADELPHIA CAN SAVE ITS WAGE TAX 
If the courts conclude that the Philadelphia wage tax violates the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, which is highly likely given its similarity to the Maryland 
tax successfully challenged in Wynne, Philadelphia will have to either 
eliminate the tax or amend it so that the tax is internally consistent. If 
Philadelphia decides to keep the wage tax, then to comply with the 
Constitution, Philadelphia’s wage tax rates must obey Equation 2. Notice that 
Equation 2 does not specify tax rates; rather it specifies a relationship among 
tax rates. A state may set its tax rates high or low. Moreover, a state has 
flexibility to set any two tax rates it chooses, but given any two tax rates, the 
third rate is constrained. Thus, although the Dormant Commerce Clause 
prevents a state from setting its tax on domestic income independently from 
its tax on interstate (inbound and outbound) income, it nevertheless provides 
a state with multiple ways to cure a violation. 
For example, suppose Philadelphia determines that it wants to maintain 
both the current inbound tax rate, Ti, of 3.4828% and the current outbound 
tax rate, To, of 3.91% without allowing either a credit or deduction. Philadelphia 
can maintain both of those tax rates consistently with the Dormant Commerce 
Clause by raising the domestic tax rate, Td, to no less than the combined 
inbound and outbound tax rates, or 7.3928%.50 While such a tax would be 
internally consistent, the sharp rise in tax rates on residents working in 
Philadelphia would likely discourage people from living in Philadelphia.51 
A second way for Philadelphia to save its wage tax would be for the City 
to eliminate the inbound tax (Ti), the tax paid by nonresidents on income 
earned in Philadelphia. This is how the New York City income tax operates, 
which is why New York City is not at risk of having the courts determine that 
its rate structure violates of the Dormant Commerce Clause.52 Eliminating 
the inbound tax would at first redound to the benefit of commuters, who 
would keep more of their Philadelphia wages. In time, employers would be 
expected to lower their wages (relative to wages paid outside of Philadelphia 
where there is no such tax), thereby increasing employment in the City. In 
effect, the wage tax becomes a residence tax. Such a tax would discourage 
 
50 If the City were to allow residents to deduct taxes paid to other jurisdictions from  
outbound income, the minimum domestic tax rate would be 7.2566%, which is calculated as:  
Td ≥ Ti + To – (Ti × To), that is, 3.4828% + 3.91% – (3.4828% x 3.91%) = 7.2566%. See supra note 46. 
51 The change could be made revenue neutral by lowering the inbound and outbound tax rates 
from their current level and raising the domestic rate so that Equation 2 is satisfied. 
52 See James W. Wetzler, Fixing Discrimination in New York’s Local Income Taxes, ST. TAX 
TODAY, June 25, 2015, at 139-7, (arguing that the rate structure of New York’s residency tax does not 
violate the internal consistency test, but two aspects of the tax—its interaction with the 
unincorporated business tax and its statutory residence rule—are internally inconsistent). 
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living in Philadelphia, but it would not discourage working there. To be 
revenue neutral, however, both the domestic and outbound tax rates would 
have to rise, further encouraging emigration out of Philadelphia. 
A third way for Philadelphia to save its wage tax would be for the City to 
eliminate the outbound tax. In this case, Philadelphia could raise the inbound 
tax to the domestic tax rate without failing the internal consistency test. 
Taxing income only where it is earned would resemble how most nations tax 
cross-border income. Most nations tax the income earned within their 
borders by both residents and nonresidents, while exempting income earned 
abroad. However, an important difference between cities and nations is that 
it is much easier for jobs and people to cross municipal boundaries than 
national boundaries. Elimination of the outbound tax, which would have to 
be accompanied by an increase in the domestic and inbound tax rates to be 
revenue neutral, would further discourage employment in Philadelphia. 
A fourth option for Philadelphia is to grant a credit for taxes paid by 
Philadelphia residents to other jurisdictions.53 Such a solution resembles the 
United States’ approach to taxing cross-border income. The United States 
taxes U.S. persons on their worldwide income and allows a credit for taxes 
paid to other jurisdictions on income sourced outside of the United States. 
That approach would also follow Maryland, which responded to its loss in 
Wynne by providing residents with a credit for taxes paid to other states’ 
county and municipal governments on outbound income.54 Whether such an 
approach would protect the Maryland “county” tax (and, similarly, the 
Philadelphia wage tax) from constitutional challenge has yet to be determined 
and is not clear.55 If, however, such a fix would be sufficient, the revenue cost 
 
53 We discussed the options for Maryland to cure the internal consistency in its tax regime in 
our amicus brief, and those options are also open to Philadelphia. Knoll & Mason Brief, supra note 
39, at 28-32. For a discussion of the requirements for state taxes to not distort interstate commerce 
when the taxing state offers a credit for taxes paid to other states (which differ from the requirements 
when the state is not offering a credit), see Mason & Knoll, Tax Discrimination, supra note 41, at 1063-
64, 1072-74. 
54 Maryland Comptroller Updates FAQs on Wynne to Address Additional Credit, Interest Claims, ST. 
TAX TODAY Dec. 7, 2015, at 238-19. 
55 There are at least two potential hurdles. First, because local taxes are state taxes for 
constitutional purposes, it is not clear whether crediting local taxes, but not state taxes, would save 
Maryland’s “county” tax and Philadelphia’s wage tax. Second, assuming municipalities do not 
generally have to credit state taxes against local taxes, the Philadelphia wage tax would still arguably 
fail the internal consistency test if it credited only local taxes paid in other states. For example, 
assume New Jersey adopts a wage tax like Philadelphia’s, which applies only in Camden. Camden 
(Philadelphia) residents earning income in Philadelphia (Camden) will pay the same tax on income 
earned in Camden and Philadelphia (3.91%). Camden (Philadelphia) residents will also pay the same 
tax on income earned in their home state of New Jersey (Pennsylvania), but not in Camden 
(Philadelphia) (3.91%). Also, New Jersey (Pennsylvania) residents living outside Camden 
(Philadelphia) will pay the same tax on income earned in New Jersey outside of Camden and on 
income earned in Pennsylvania outside of Philadelphia (3.4828%). However, New Jersey 
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of limiting the credit to taxes imposed by other cities and counties (and 
excluding states) would likely be low.56 If, however, a municipality seeking to 
cure an internally inconsistent tax with a credit must credit not only other 
states’ county or municipal taxes, but also other states’ state taxes, the cost to 
the City would likely be much higher, especially in light of Philadelphia’s 
proximity to Delaware, New Jersey, and New York, all of which have income 
tax rates above Pennsylvania’s flat tax rate of 3.07%. In that case, to be 
revenue-neutral, Philadelphia would have to raise tax rates, thereby 
discouraging both working and living in Philadelphia. 
In the last few paragraphs we have described how Philadelphia could 
revise its wage tax to save it from violating the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
The more fundamental question is whether Philadelphia should save the City 
wage tax or replace it with other taxes. As a 2014 report on the prospects for 
job growth in Philadelphia observes: 
 Two successive tax commissions, one in 2003 and one in 2009, noted 
that many of Philadelphia’s ailments are self-inflicted. Industrial jobs are 
gone, but the downward cycle endures. As the 2009 Task Force on Jobs and 
Economic Competitiveness suggested, “The fundamental problem is that 
Philadelphia has a tax structure that was appropriate to an industrial economy 
when people and firms were tied to the fixed assets of railroads, factories, and 
ports. By continuing to derive the lion’s share of locally generated revenues 
by taxing people and jobs that are now highly mobile, we continue to 
undermine our future.”57 
As the quotation above makes clear, the Philadelphia wage tax has long 
been criticized for undermining the City’s economy by discouraging people 
from living and working in Philadelphia. 
Although the Philadelphia wage tax has been around for more than 
seventy-five years, its days—at least in its current form—appear numbered. 
In the next few years, the courts will likely declare the City wage tax 
unconstitutional. That threat is an opportunity for the City to modernize its 
 
(Pennsylvania) residents living outside Camden (Philadelphia) will pay more tax on income earned 
in Philadelphia (Camden) (3.91%) than on income earned in their home state of New Jersey 
(Pennsylvania) outside of Camden (Philadelphia) (3.4828%). This is one place where the structural 
differences between the Maryland “county” tax and the Philadelphia wage tax can have 
constitutional consequences. Assuming Delaware adopts Maryland’s “county” tax, regardless of 
where Delaware and Maryland residents reside and earn income, one always pays the same tax on 
interstate and intrastate income. 
56 With the exception of Wilmington, Delaware, there are few counties or municipalities close 
to Philadelphia that impose income taxes on nonresidents. Cf. Saksa, supra note 7 (describing 
Wilmington’s tax). 
57 PATHWAYS TO JOB GROWTH, supra note 2, at 15. 
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tax system. Whether Philadelphia takes advantage of that opportunity 
remains to be seen. 
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